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1. Introduction
The liberalisation of markets and the globalisation that the world has wit-
nessed in the course of the recent decades, has made the movement of 
capital and goods on and between different continents easier than ever 
before. The greater size of the market allows in-depth specialisation 
which is the key enabler of productivity growth. Specialisation brings also 
about the increasing fragmentation and delocalisation of various eco-
nomic activities that are part of a value chain of any specific product or 
service.
Indeed, the total world trade of merchandise and commercial services has 
increased from 4,230 billion USD in 1990 to 19,900 billion USD in 2008 
(in current prices) (WTO 2009). Proportionally, the volume of trade of 
manufactured intermediate goods increased between 1988 and 2006 
from 2,018 billion USD to 9,580 billion USD (in constant prices). Further-
more, it appears that the electronics industry has benefited remarkably 
from the ongoing trend of globalisation, as the share of electronics has 
increased from 8.1% to 17.4% of the total trade of manufactured inter-
mediate goods (Cattaneo et al 2010: 248).3
For a long time, globalisation was primarily about off-shoring the produc-
tion or customer care activities to lower cost locations. However, it has 
become increasingly apparent since the turn of the century that it is not 
only the more cost-sensitive production tasks but also the R&D and 
design of the new products and services that get increasingly relocated 
from developed to developing countries (Cattaneo et al 2010). One can 
therefore argue that we are witnessing the transformation of the global 
production networks into the global innovation networks (GIN), where not 
only the production but also innovation takes place on the global scale 
(INGINEUS). As companies and regions specialise in different fragments 
of GINs, we expect them to require different competences and resources. 
Prior to assessing the impact of GINs in the EU, we need to understand 
the general industry dynamics, company strategies that determine their 
activities, and the competences involved.
In this paper we focus on the electronics industry, and more specifically 
on the production of telecommunications systems, which is characterised 
both by very rapid growth of the global trade and very high ratio of R&D 
investments in the sales revenues (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al 2010). 
More specifically, we analyse the distinctly different development paths 
of the three major telecommunications systems producers in the Nordic 
countries: Ericsson, Elcoteq and Skype. Ericsson was established in 
1876, and has been a well-known brand name for decades. By contrast, 
Elcoteq grew from a small company into a global multinational corpora-
tion in less than a decade only in the 1990s. As a global company, 
Skype is still less than ten years old, but it facilitates today more interna-
tional calls than any other telecommunications operator on the planet.
The evolution of the technologies and the market demand, as well as the 
competition situation in the industry and the particular location based 
advantages, are all important factors that determine the behaviour of 
these specific companies. Therefore, we start the analysis by presenting 
a short overview of the general industry dynamics in the telecommunica-
tions equipment manufacturing. Subsequently, we briefly summarise the 
corporate history of the three case study firms – Ericsson, Elcoteq and 
Skype – in relation to Estonia as the host economy. The aim will be to 
establish the interplay between the broader industry dynamics, corporate 
strategy and location choice. In other words, we are interested in the dif-
ferent push and pull factors that have led to the relocation of specific 
activities to Estonia or away from Estonia. 
This way, we set the stage for analysing the role of capability building as 
one of the crucial factors in determining the possibilities for moving from 
the relatively simpler manufacturing or service functions to the more 4
knowledge intensive and value added R&D and product development 
activities. The subsequent chapters of this paper deal with capability 
building that has taken place on the level of the public education and R&D 
systems and on the company level in the case study firms. Finally, we 
discuss catching-up strategies for latecomers in a modern R&D intensive 
industry, such as ICTs and electronics.
2. Recent developments in the industry
2.1. The global telecommunications equipment production
In the period of 1990-2000s, with the advent of the Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM) standard and the broad take-up of the 
mobile telephony services by consumers, the Nordic telecommunications 
equipment manufacturers became the global market leaders both in the 
manufacturing of the mobile telephones and the related network equip-
ment. The United States and Japan were developing competing standards 
which had internationally less success than the European GSM standard. 
Nokia had 31% and Ericsson 10% of the mobile phone handsets market 
in 2000. Motorola, as the closest competitor, had 15% of the market in 
the same year. When Nokia was the leader in the manufacturing of the 
handsets, then Ericsson had remarkable 30% and Nokia 10% of the 
mobile telecommunications infrastructure equipment market. Motorola had 
13%, Lucent 11% and Nortel 9% of the infrastructure equipment market 
in 1999. (Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila 2003, Porter & Sölvell 2006: 13).
In order to properly understand the sources of the Nordic competitive 
strengths in the mobile communications industry, one should consider the 
respective investments and the evolution of the mobile telecommunica-
tions in the Nordic countries at least since 1970-1980s. The various ele-
ments of the value chain of the mobile telephony industry (Figure 1) were 
fairly closely located in the Nordic countries even in the 1990s. In the 
following decade, however, both the competition situation and the geog-
raphy changed notably in this industry.5
Figure 1. Mobile telephony value chain
Source: Sölvell & Porter 2006.
The initial saturation of the market, Nasdaq crash and the emergence of 
the next generation (3G) mobile telephony standards
1
 led to a significant 
restructuring of the industry in the early 2000s. For example, Ericsson 
who was the market leader in network infrastructures, but had in hand-
sets a weaker market position merged its handsets business with Sony’s. 
Siemens merged, for similar reasons, its network infrastructures business 
with Nokia, and sold its handsets business all together to the Taiwanese 
BenQ. 
Although the market share of the Asian producers was negligible in the 
turn of the century, various emerging market actors, such as Samsung, 
LG (both Korea), Huawei (China), and others have been rapidly building 
up their product development and manufacturing capabilities. Further-
more, various integrated microchips and ready-made integrated platforms 
that are instrumental for developing mobile telephones, have became 
readily available from the various semiconductor manufacturers, such as 
Qualcomm, Infineon, ST-Ericsson, MediaTek. Thereby, from the technologi-
cal point of view the mobile telephone market has become much easier 
1  At the time of the development of the original GSM standards, no one could properly estimate 
the future importance of the mobile data communications. Therefore, the original GSM standard 
foresaw only the possibilities for a very limited (9600 bps) speed of data communications. The 
shift from the GSM (2G) mobile telephony systems to the 2.5G (EDGE), 3G and the forthcoming 
4G networks is, therefore, foremost about the increasing of the bandwidth that could be made 
available for the mobile data communications.6
to enter for the new actors. What matters the most in the low end of this 
market, is the market power and access to the end customers at large 
emerging markets, such as South-East Asia and Africa.
In the 1990s, the product development and manufacturing were, although 
dependent on the independent suppliers of microelectronics components, 
fairly closely connected in Western Europe and in the United States. How-
ever, with the saturation of the European and other developed country 
markets, Asia became both the greatest growing market and the largest 
manufacturing base. The mobile telephony production value chain have 
become truly globalised in the course of the last decade.
For example, the Apple’s iPhone, which is one of the today’s most eye-
catching electronics products, is actually manufactured by the Taiwanese 
Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd, while the various microelectronics 
components are sourced from different companies and manufacturing 
plants across the globe. Thus, the various parts of the Apple iPhone 
related global innovation and production networks are indeed dispersed 
across the globe. The iPhone 4 display, application processor and memo-
ry come from LG and Samsung in Korea, radio chips come from Broadcom 
and Intel in the U.S., and Infeon in Germany, and the various smaller 
components come from elsewhere (iSuppli 2010). 
Sony Ericsson’s mobile telephones build similarly on the standard compo-
nents that have been designed by the various major microelectronics 
firms, such as Qualcomm, Texas Instruments in the U.S., Avago in Singa-
pore, etc. (Figure 2).7
Figure 2. Schematic Sony Ericsson Xperia X1
Source: iFixit 2010.
Both the major brand names in the telecommunications equipment manu-
facturing, but also their component providers operate on global basis. 
Their headquarters, marketing, R&D and product development, manufac-
turing, services and support activities, etc., are located in different parts 
of the world.
The fact that the various semiconductor components and ready-made 
modules of the mobile telephones are increasingly readily available to 
anyone and the whole production chain has become truly global has 
shifted the very nature of the market competition in this industry in recent 
decades. The market competition in the telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing is not about mastering the development and production of 
the individual products any more, but about development and command-
ing the whole ecosystems of different organisations who are involved in 
the whole product life cycle from R&D and product development to 
manufacturing, sales and customer care (Figure 3).8
Figure 3. Innovation networks and ecosystems
Source: Ollila 2011.
Apple has recently managed to control its whole global innovation and 
production network in a way no other mobile phone manufacturer has 
been able to follow. This together with the superior product design and 
the specialisation in the upper end of the market allows Apple to reap 
unrivalled economic benefits.
2
 Although Apple sells only 4% of all mobile 
telephones, it collects a remarkable 50% of the total profits of the mobile 
handset industry. By contrast, the former market leader Nokia has been 
recently underperforming. Nokia sells still 32% of all handsets, but it has 
been increasingly competing in the overcrowded lower end of the market, 
and this has allowed it to benefit from only 15% of the industry profits 
(Figure 4).
2  The various iPhone components cost only $187.5 and the assembly only $6.5 of the $600 
iPhone 4 sales price (iSuppli 2010).9
Figure 4. Earnings of the major mobile telephone producers.
Source: Asymco 2010.
The Nokia’s and Sony Ericsson’s recent failure to capitalise on the smart-
phone market is largely due to the failure of the Symbian operating system 
that (OS) Nokia and Sony-Ericsson have been developing jointly with some 
other manufacturers. Unfortunately, the Symbian consortium has been 
never able to establish a consistent OS that would allow for the development 
of applications that run without modifications on a myriad of different hand-
sets produced by Nokia, Sony Ericsson and others. The development and 
maintenance of applications that run on multiple similar but mutually incom-
patible platforms is costly. It is also confusing for the end users to figure out 
what specific version of the software they should acquire. As a result, the 
Symbian mobile applications market never took off, and Apple has overtaken 
the market leadership with its innovative touch-screen user inter  faces and 
iTunes App Store, which everyone else now attempts to copy. 
The competition for the establishment of a de facto standard of the mobile 
operating system is, however, still ongoing. Google, another newcomer at 
the mobile telephony market, is currently Apple’s fastest growing and 
strongest contender in the fierce competition for establishment of a dom-
inant software platform. Sony Ericsson has started a partnership with 
Google and introduced its first Android powered smartphone in the spring 
of 2010. On 11 February 2011, Nokia announced a new software partner-
ship with Microsoft, another ailing giant that has failed to establish its 
software stronghold in the mobile telephone industry (Bloomberg 2011)
3
.
3  Both Apple and Google have also taken serious steps at extending their iOS and Android 
platforms beyond mobile telephones to other devices such as, e.g., the tablet computers and 
flat screen TVs, and have come up with the Apple TV and Google TV systems respectively.10
The mobile telephone network equipment market is another completely 
different market segment for the telecommunications equipment manu-
facturing industry, which has a rather different competition and demand 
dynamics as compared to the market for handsets. 
The infrastructure equipment market contracted in 2009-2010, as the 
operators cut spending during the recession and aggressive Chinese ven-
dors drove down the prices. In this market segment, Ericsson continues 
to be the market leader with 33.6% of the market in Q3 2010, while the 
Chinese Huawei (20.6%) has performed recently slightly better than 
Nokia Siemens Networks (19.8%). The fourth largest player, the U.S. 
based Alcatel-Lucent had 16.2% of the market (Reuters 2010). 
What makes this market different is that it is not the consumers but the 
network operators who are the equipment manufacturer’s clients. The 
number of individual units sold to this market is much smaller than the 
number of mobile telephones sold, and the variety of consumer prefer-
ences and the different models of the products is also much more limited 
here. Nonetheless, the market for the mobile telecommunications net-
work equipment continues to be anything but a fully harmonised global 
market that relies on universally adopted global standards. 
The developed countries continue to be the main market both for the 
high-end smartphones and for the 4G (Long-Term Evolution, LTE) infra-
structure equipment, while the continued rolling-out of the simpler tele-
phones, and the 2G and 3G network infrastructure will drive the growth 
at the developing markets
4
. Some of the large developing nations, e.g. 
China, are also moving very fast to the 4G technologies. Furthermore, 
they continue to compete with the major developed nations for the stan-
dardisation of their particular specifications of the 4G networks and 
protocols. 
The different market dynamics and smaller production volumes imply, in 
turn, different location choices for the development and manufacturing of 
the infrastructure equipment as compared to the handsets.
2.2. The importance of the telecommunications equipment industry for 
Estonia and the Nordic countries
ICT sector is one of the most knowledge and R&D intensive industries 
both globally and in the Baltic Sea Region. However, both the size and 
4  The transition from 2G to 3G to 4G networks is primarily about allowing for a major increase 
in the data communications bandwidths in the mobile telephone networks.11
the knowledge intensity of the ICT sector vary substantially both across 
the different ICT sub-sectors in the different countries in the region. The 
share of the ICT sector in the GDP is in Finland and Sweden among the 
highest in Europe. This is largely due to the major contribution of the 
manufacturing industry, in particular the manufacturing of telecommuni-
cations equipment. The presence of a strong ICT manufacturing sector is 
indeed what distinguishes the Nordic countries from the majority of the 
other European economies, where the ICT sector accounts only for 3-4% 
of the GDP (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. The ratio of the ICT sector value added to the GDP in 2005
Source: Turlea et al 2009: 46.
Finland has a particularly strong specialisation in the manufacturing of the 
telecommunications equipment. In fact, Nokia’s remarkable success in 
the last decades has been clearly visible in the Finnish economy, espe-
cially when considering its small size. Nokia contributed more than 2% of 
the Finnish GDP growth in 2000. More recently, however, the consolida-
tion of the industry and the rise of the U.S. and Asia based competitors 
has changed the situation substantially. Nokia’s contribution to the eco-
nomic growth in Finland was negative even during the global crisis in 
2008-2009 (Ali-Yrkkö 2010: 12). In contrast, Sweden’s industry is much 
more diversified which makes it much less dependent on particular large 
companies such as Ericsson, or other multinationals that are headquar-
tered in Sweden.
The important role of the telecommunications equipment manufacturing in 
Finland and Sweden is even more visible in the export figures. Finland’s and 12
Sweden’s exports of goods doubled between the 1995 and 2009. Estonia’s 
exports grew in this period even more rapidly. While this is the case, it can 
be observed that the export of telecommunications equipment in all three 
countries clearly hit the peak around the turn of the century (Figure 6). 
This has, once again, to do with Nokia in case of Finland, and Ericsson in 
Sweden. Estonia’s exports in the telecommunications equipment have 
also predominantly to do with the two above-mentioned companies. Their 
manufacturing service provider Elcoteq has been for more than a decade 
responsible for the vast majority of imports and exports of telecommuni-
cations equipment to and from Estonia (Tiits & Jüriado 2006).
Figure 6. The share of the telecommunications equipment in the total exports 
of goods
Source: Authors’ calculations, ComExt 2011.
In order to shed some light on the location decisions both for the R&D and 
manufacturing activities of the major players in the telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing, we present first the cases of Ericsson and 
Elcoteq. Thereafter, we contrast these with Skype, a disruptive software 
firm that has become the largest provider of international calls in less than 
half a decade. In addition, it has challenged the whole business model of 
the established telecommunications industry. Ericsson and Elcoteq located 
primarily their manufacturing activities into Estonia, while Estonia has been 
since the very beginning the location of Skype’s main engineering centre.
Both these firms’ motivations for operating in Estonia and their intra-firm 
capability building activities are, as seen in the following chapters, also 13
very different. The capability building that does or does not take place 
within the firms and their location choice depends, however, also strong-
ly on the success of the public education and R&D systems in making the 
qualified workforce available to the firms. We review, therefore, prior to 
discussing the case study firms briefly the recent supply of the ICT work-
force at the various qualification levels in Estonia.
3. Competence building on the national level in Estonia
3.1. The availability of R&D personnel
The number of researchers and engineers remains, both in absolute terms 
and as a ratio to the employment, lower than that of the Nordic countries. 
While Estonia’s public sector R&D efforts remain, both in terms of  per-
sonnel and investments, comparable to the European Union average,   
industrial R&D lags behind.
The Estonia’s total R&D personnel count was close to 9900 persons 
(5500 in full-time equivalent) in 2009. This includes 7500 researchers 
and engineers (4300 researchers and engineers in full-time equivalent), 
while the rest are technicians and supporting staff (Statistics Estonia 
2011). This is, in absolute terms, a relatively small number of researchers 
that is comparable to a single research lab of a major multinational cor-
poration. 
The fact that the full-time equivalent of the R&D personnel varies in Esto-
nia significantly from the total number of R&D personnel is explained by 
two reasons. About one half of the R&D personnel in Estonia is employed 
in the higher education sector, whereas the majority of the R&D person-
nel acts there half of the time as researcher and half of the time as teach-
ing staff. Similarly, in the enterprise sector, most of the R&D staff under-
takes various other tasks besides R&D activities (e.g. product develop-
ment, market research) rather than being involved in pure R&D.
Statistics Estonia provides us with no estimation of the number of ICT 
researchers in the public sector, but the Estonian Research Portal which is 
the official interface for national R&D funding applications, lists altogether 
410 persons who are active in the field of computer science as their field 
of research. However, only 162 of them have at least one publication 
referred in ISI Web of Science, and only 127 of them have a PhD degree.
5
 
5  Estonian Research Portal that is for public sector institutions the interface to national R&D 
funding. See: http://www.etis.ee.14
By the same token, Lipmaa has identified 131 Estonian computer scien-
tists that have at least one citation of their research paper.
6
 Based on this, 
we estimate that in Estonian public sector there are no more than 150 
reasonably active and productive computer scientists.
The Estonian business enterprise sector had about 3100 R&D personnel 
(2900 in full-time equivalent) in 2009. The above included 189 persons 
(118 in FTE) of R&D staff who were in the manufacturing of electric and 
optical equipment and 712 (572 in FTE) R&D staff who were involved in 
computer related activities. Thus, Estonian ICT enterprises had a R&D 
staff of no more than 1,000 (700 in FTE) in 2009 (Statistics Estonia 
2011). Furthermore, the industrial ICT R&D personnel is also very con-
centrated in terms of the number of the enterprises. A tiny number of 
relatively larger R&D and product development intensive ICT firms such 
as Skype, Playtech and Cybernetica are most likely to employ vast major-
ity of the above-mentioned R&D staff.
Given the above, Estonia’s R&D investments remain also significantly 
lower than those of Finland or Sweden, for example. Estonia’s gross R&D 
expenditure (GERD) was 1.4% of GDP in 2009 (1.3% of GDP in 2008), 
while Sweden’s and Finland’s GERD continues to be more than 3% of 
GDP. Comparatively speaking, Estonia is lagging behind primarily due to 
the smaller number of R&D personnel in the industrial sector, which has 
in turn to do with the structure of the industry itself. 
Estonia does not possess, similarly to most of the newer EU member sta-
tes, a highly R&D intensive ICT and electronics industry. Foreign in  vest-
ment enterprises, which are responsible for the vast majority of elec-
tronics exports, have located only relatively less demanding production 
functions here. Furthermore, Estonia does not have a strong biotechnol-
ogy, pharmaceutical or automotive industry. Yet, the above-mentioned 
industries are responsible for the vast majority of the global industrial R&D 
investments (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al 2010).
3.2. The supply of the ICT sector labour force 
There are about 20 different vocational schools in Estonia that offer edu-
cation in the fields of computer sciences and/or in the electronics and 
automation. In some schools a modest number of students (15-20 peo-
ple) is admitted in the above-mentioned ICT programmes, while the larger 
schools admit to the ICT studies up to 300-500 new students annually. 
6  Helger Lipmaa, data last modified 1 July 2009, http://research.cyber.ee/~lipmaa/cites/php/
estcit.php.15
This raises some questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organisation of the vocational education system, especially when one 
compares the admittance numbers with the number of people graduating.
The number of people graduating from vocational education has decreased 
in Estonia by approximately 20% in the last decade. The decrease in the 
number of graduates has been even faster in the computer sciences, 
while there has been at least twofold increase in the graduation rate in 
the field of electronics and automatics (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Graduation from the ICT vocational education in Estonia
Note: On the both scales the number of graduated students is indicated.
Source: Estonian Ministry of Education and Research 2011.
Unfortunately, the ICT related vocational education system is not very 
efficiently organized in Estonia. Each year an average of 392 computer sci-
ences and 362 electronics and automatics students discontinue their stud-
ies (based on the statistics from the years 2005-2010). In other words, in 
the ICT fields roughly every second student stopped with their studies.
The prospective new students have given higher education very strong 
preference over vocational education. This is clearly visible in the increase 
of the admittance to the higher education in general, as well as to the ICT 
related higher education in particular. The share of the computer sciences 
increased from 3% to 7% among the newly admitted students in the 
higher education in the years 1997-2002, and has remained stable since 
then (Statistics Estonia 2011). A similar increase in the importance of the 
computer science is also visible in the number of people graduating from 
higher education (Figure 8).16
Figure 8. Graduation from the ICT higher education in Estonia
Note: The above data refers to the graduation in the computer sciences.
Source: Statistics Estonia, 2011.
The higher education system suffers, however, similarly to the voca-
tional education, from the delays in studies and a very high student drop-
out rate. About half of the students did not complete their studies in 
computer sciences in a timely manner in Estonia in the recent years. The 
high demand for work force, the need to work in order to fund the stud-
ies, and the modest quality of some of the study programmes are all 
likely to contribute to the high discontinuation frequency of the studies.
Another issue is that ICT curricula stem from traditional branches of study 
and science – on one hand from physics and engineering and on the 
other hand from mathematics and informatics – even though the needs 
of the present-day industry presume a synthesis of both areas and more. 
Modern ICT companies do not just produce, install and maintain ICT tools 
and systems. They have to be in touch with business systems in a par-
ticular application area and to able to see ICT tools in this context. There-
fore, in addition to the engineering and informatics background they also 
need to be ready for an interdisciplinary approach, where the emphasis is 
on the applications solving rather than the ICTs per se. Even though tradi-
tio  nal curricula that focus on engineering and informatics are necessary, 
there is also a need for curricula that integrate both areas and are inter-
disciplinary (Figure 9). 17
Figure 9. The profile of ICT industry’s needs for Degree Qualifications
Source: Career Space and International Co-operation Europe Ltd 2001 
The various studies on Estonian ICT education conclude that a lack of 
skilled labour is the main factor that hinders the development of local 
companies, whereas skilled labour would allow them to rapidly move 
ahead in areas where they already have a certain competence for devel-
opment activities. Important shortcomings that were brought out are 
insufficient specialisation and in certain areas also weak basic education 
(e.g. system analysis). The problem can be summarised as follows: 
people who have acquired higher education need a couple of months or 
even up to a year before they meet the requirements and interests of the 
companies. At the same time, the knowledge and skill base of experi-
enced people is relatively low, making it a starting point from which it is 
hard to strongly and rapidly move towards R&D activities (Kattel and 
Kalvet 2006).
The Estonian ICT sector, which employed all together 15565 persons in 
2010, has according to a recent study currently about 1700 vacancies, 
and there is a need for about 4200 additional bachelor’s or master’s 
level employees within the next three years (ITL 2011). The current sup-
ply of the highly qualified labour is not, unfortunately, able to meet such 
a demand. The demographic trends in Estonia contribute to the chal-
lenges in the supply of qualified labour even further. The new students to 
be admitted to the ICT higher education will decline in Estonia twofold 
between the years 2008-2015 (Figure 10).18
Figure 10. Number of first year IT students admitted
Source: Praxis, authors’ calculations.
Overall, as long as the supply of the research and engineering personnel 
for the ICTs and the other science intensive industries remains insuffi-
cient, upgrading to the more R&D intensive activities remains constrained 
at the enterprise level and Estonia’s total business R&D investment is also 
bound to remain significantly lower than that of Finland or Sweden.
4. Firms’ motivation for operating in and from Estonia
4.1. Established major brand name: the case of Ericsson
Ericsson was founded in 1876 as a telegraph repair shop. In the early 20th 
century, Ericsson was a rapidly growing international company that was 
very interested in the rapidly growing markets of the eastern shores of 
the Baltic Sea. The Swedish company even considered moving its head-
quarters to St. Petersburg, Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution put an end 
to this plan in 1917. Some of Ericsson’s leading engineers moved from 
the St. Petersburg factory to Tartu, Estonia and contributed to the devel-
opment of the local telephone factory (Tartu Telefonivabrik). Eventually, 
this Estonian company became Ericsson’s most important partner in East-
ern Europe, as it started to produce telephones under a licence from 
Ericsson and under the Ericsson brand name (Högselius 2005:56). World 
War II and the resulting occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union 
brought an end to this business relationship.19
Ericsson was one of the pioneers of the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) 
and GSM telephone systems in the 1980–1990s, when the two Nordic 
firms Nokia and Ericsson were the global market leaders in manufacturing 
mobile telecommunications equipment. Ericsson continued to offer 
exchanges and other infrastructure equipment for fixed telecommunica-
tions and special radio communications networks. 
These were the main products Ericsson was interested in finding new 
markets for, when Estonia had restored its independence in the early 
1990s. Shortly after independence Swedish Telia and Finnish Sonera 
became shareholders of the dominant fixed telephony company Estonian 
Telecom, along with the government of Estonia. Soon very rapid develop-
ment of the new digital communications networks started, and Ericsson 
became an important vendor of new technologies in the first major deals, 
including digital telephone exchanges for the fixed telephony network and 
slightly later also the NMT mobile telephony network.
As discussed above, Ericsson handed the manufacturing of mobile telepho-
nes over to Sony Ericsson – the joint venture of Sony and Ericsson – when 
the consolidation of the industry started in the 2000s. Furthermore, Erics-
son’s subsidiary ST Ericsson also started to sell mobile telephone compo-
nents and kits to third parties. Ericsson itself continues, however, to be the 
market leader for the manufacture of mobile telephone network equip  ment. 
This is also visible in the specialisation of its Estonian subsidiary.
Ericsson Estonia started as a local representative and a wholesale organ-
isation that caters for the needs of local clients in Estonia in the early 
1990s. In time, in addition to the wholesale of Ericsson equipment, the 
share of the various value added services such as network planning and 
systems integration started to increase in sales. For example, Ericsson 
Estonia started to serve network operators in Denmark, Sweden and 
Japan in the early 2000s. 
Today, Ericsson Estonia provides telephony and data communications 
systems planning, integration and maintenance services to various clients. 
In recent years, the network maintenance services provided to the various 
network operators in the Baltic States have also gained in importance. 
The logistics unit of Ericsson Estonia serves the other Baltic and Nordic 
firms within the Ericsson group. For 2008–2009, about half of the sales 
revenues were earned from the sales of telecom equipment and the other 
half from the sales of various services.
In summary, Ericsson Estonia predominantly sales and service functions 
in Estonia for two decades. Ericsson’s R&D and product development 20
activities continue to take place in its major corporate development cen-
tres outside Estonia. Ericsson Estonia’s activities were primarily upgraded 
in the 1990s and 2000s due to the gradual extension of the services 
portfolio from basic sales and support activities to more knowledge-
intensive network infrastructure planning and maintenance services as 
well as support for the development of various value added telephony and 
Internet services. 
Occasionally, some middleware solutions have also been developed for 
Ericsson mobile telephone networks in Estonia. For example, a mobile 
positioning system was developed for the 112 emergency services in 
cooperation with the Estonian GIS firm Regio in the early 2000s. This 
system allows the geographic location of a mobile telephone that has 
placed an incoming phone call to be automatically detected based on the 
mobile telephone network. Later, Regio started to offer an advanced ver-
sion of this mobile positioning system internationally under the Ericsson 
brand name. Such cooperation with Regio as a local partner has, how-
ever, been mostly handled directly from Sweden.
However, the profile of the Ericsson organisation in Estonia changed sig-
nificantly when Ericsson acquired a major share of the Elcoteq facility in 
Tallinn in 2010. Ericsson has had Elcoteq as a global manufacturing part-
ner for two decades. Even though Elcoteq manufactured for Ericsson in 
Estonia, there was no direct business between the subsidiaries of these 
two firms in Estonia. With this recent deal, Ericsson took over the facili-
ties and personnel that Elcoteq used for offering Ericsson electronics 
manufacturing services. For Ericsson’s part, this acquisition of the manu-
facturing operations in Estonia does not seem to have been part of a 
longer-term corporate plan for the expansion of the facilities in Estonia. It 
was rather a chance event that was connected to the restructuring of 
Elcoteq’s global network that the global economic crisis brought about in 
2008–2009.
The number of Ericsson employees grew considerably with the acquisi-
tion and expansion of manufacturing activities in Estonia. Ericsson Esto-
nia had about 100 employees in 2007–2008. The number of Ericsson 
Estonia employees increased, however, with the acquisition of the 
Elcoteq plant and the transfer of the more than 1200 related personnel to 
Ericsson at the beginning of 2010.
Earlier, Elcoteq manufactured equipment for the 2G and 3G mobile com-
munications networks as well as for the fixed broadband networks in 
Tallinn for Ericsson. After the change of ownership, the production of 4G 
data communications network equipment was launched in Estonia in May 21
2010. This production line achieved full capacity by August 2010. Erics-
son exports most of the equipment produced in Estonia to various net-
work operators in Europe, North America and Africa, but some of it also 
remains on the local market where TeliaSonera’s local subsidiary EMT 
continues to be Ericsson’s local key customer. 
More broadly speaking, the specialisation of the Tallinn plant in Ericsson’s 
global production network did not change after the change of ownership. 
The Tallinn plant continues to provide electronics manufacturing services 
for Ericsson, just as it did under Elcoteq’s ownership. As previously, Erics-
son’s research and product development continues to take place outside 
Estonia, while the subsidiary in Estonia focuses primarily on the organisation 
of manufacturing, etc. Accordingly, learning by doing and manufacturing-
related organisational innovation remain the main forms of development.
Ericsson does not disclose the exact production figures for the Estonian 
plant, but it is still obvious that Ericsson’s contribution to Estonia’s for-
eign trade is massive. According to Veiko Sepp, CEO of Ericsson Estonia 
at the time of the interview, Ericsson was responsible for about 10% of 
Estonia’s exports and about 50% of Estonia’s exports to Sweden in Q4 
2010.  
4.2. Integrated manufacturing service provider: the case of Elcoteq
Elcoteq
7
 was founded as Lohja Microelectronics in 1984 to support the 
Lohja Corporation’s (Finland) development and production of electrolumi-
nescent displays. However, this business did not develop as initially 
hoped, and some free capacity became available in Lohja Microelectron-
ics. Meanwhile, Nokia Mobira in Finland and Ericsson in Sweden had both 
developed their first Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT) telephones, the full-
scale production of which was held back by their small components 
assembly capacity, and they were looking for additional manufacturing 
expertise. This is how Lohja Microelectronics became an electronics 
manufacturing service (EMS) provider, with Nokia and Ericsson as its larg-
est customers in the early 1990s (Elcoteq 2010a).
In 1990, in preparation for a merger with another Finnish industrial con-
glomerate, Wärtsilä, Lohja Corporation restructured itself and registered 
its different business operations as separate companies. Lohja Microelec-
tronics was renamed Elcoteq. Metra corporation, which emerged as the 
result of the merger, did not however consider microelectronics to be its 
7 Hereinafter ‘Elcoteq’ refers to the Elcoteq corporation globally, and ‘Elcoteq Tallinn’ refers to 
the particular subsidiary established in Estonia.22
core business, and Elcoteq went through a management buy-out in 1991. 
This was the beginning of Elcoteq as an independent enterprise with both 
Nokia and Ericsson as its key customers.
In the early 1990s, when Swedish and Finnish entrepreneurs were the 
first to invest in Estonia, Elcoteq started pilot production in Estonia 
already in 1992, and formally established a subsidiary in Estonia in 1993. 
This was Elcoteq's very first subsidiary abroad. Although initially various 
Asian countries had been considered as a potential location, a better 
alternative was eventually found closer to home in Tallinn.
One of the Elcoteq Tallinn's veterans has described the creative destruc-
tion that took place in the early 1990s with the following words: “It was 
a productive time, the industry had collapsed and the town was full of 
unemployed engineers.” The newly employed engineers were initially sent 
for training to Finland or Sweden. Later on, training was increasingly 
orga  nised locally in Estonia.
8
 While the existing engineering in Estonia was 
trained on the latest technologies and production methods, but they were 
no more in charge of the actual product development, where Elcoteq 
itself had no say either.
In 1996, Elcoteq Tallinn started to operate as the repair centre for GSM 
mobile telephones
9
. Already in the following year, volume production of 
GSM mobile telephones was initiated, and Elcoteq became the very first 
EMS business that started to ‘box build’ mobile phones for a major brand 
name from start to finish. The fact that Ericsson had subcontracted the 
whole production of its Ericsson 628 mobile telephones brought Elcoteq 
to a completely new level of collaboration with its clients. Most notably, 
Nokia soon also followed suit. What followed can be characterised as a 
true co-evolution of the major brand names and Elcoteq as an EMS that 
was an integral part of their value chain. By the late 1990s, Elcoteq was 
producing mobile handsets in Estonia for two market leaders of the time.
10
8  When Estonian independence was restored in 1991, its economy was in a poor state. So was 
the economy of the whole former USSR. Therefore, both for political and economic reasons, 
Estonia began immediately to reorient its economy to western markets, which had both greater 
purchasing power and growth prospects. However, as became evident very soon, the majority 
of the electronics industry that Estonia had inherited was not competitive on western markets, 
and was therefore forced to close down (Tiits 2006). As a result of this, experienced workforce 
for the electronics industry was readily available in Estonia in the early 1990s.
9  GSM is widely a used acronym for the Global System for Mobile Communications, originally 
Groupe Spécial Mobile, standard, which is used in digital cellular networks.
10  Both Nokia and Ericsson were clients of the Finnish EMS firm Elcoteq already since the mid-
1980s; and Elcoteq had manufactured mobile telephone circuit boards for Ericsson already for 
a number of years.23
This was a prosperous time both for the Nordic mobile telephone produc-
ers and the EMS businesses that were working with them. The European 
mobile telephony market was booming and production and sales vol-
umes went up very rapidly. This is also very vividly reflected in both the 
Nordic and Estonian foreign trade statistics. In Estonia, telecommunica-
tion equipment had reached up to 20% of the manufactured exports by 
the turn of the century. In this period, most of the production technolo-
gies and components were imported and virtually all of the produced 
goods were exported. The share of local content other than labour 
remained virtually nonexistent. Thence, not surprisingly, the value added 
generated in the Estonian electronics industry also remained significant-
ly lower than that in traditional industries, e.g., wood processing, etc. 
(Tiits et al 2006).
In the late 1990s, Elcoteq also started to expand internationally, as 
increasingly it made sense to locate manufacturing activities close to the 
rapidly growing consumer markets. The need to serve the key customers 
– Nokia and Ericsson – at their new markets was the main driver of 
Elcoteq’s very rapid globalisation. To finance the expansion, Elcoteq’s 
shares were floated on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1997. 
First, a new manufacturing site was established in Hungary, and an office 
was established in the United States. An office was also established in 
Hong Kong for managing the manufacturing activities that were located 
in southern China, etc. In effect, within two short years Elcoteq became 
a truly global corporation. By the end of 1999, Elcoteq’s network of 
plants covered already more than ten countries in the three fastest grow-
ing regions of the world: Europe, America and Asia.
The business model and the modus operandi that were originally adopt-
ed in Finland and Estonia provided a good starting point, but needed 
adapting for Hungary, Russia, Germany, Mexico and China. Elcoteq’s 
Finnish and Estonian business development and engineering staff were 
therefore actively involved in the establishment of the new sites else-
where in the world, and in training the local staff. Also, through these 
experiences, a well-documented system was established in Elcoteq for 
transferring any specific production line from one site to another. As 
opposed to some other multinational corporations, the individual units 
within Elcoteq continue to rely on uniform standardised technologies and 
processes also today.
The NASDAQ crisis brought about consolidation and global restructuring 
in the whole ICT and electronics industry from 2001 onwards. The large-
scale manufacturing of consumer electronics, incl. mobile telephones and 24
similar, has shifted increasingly to the low-cost locations close to the final 
markets. For example, Ericsson, as the part of streamlining its value 
chains, moved the manufacturing of its mobile telephones from Elcoteq 
Tallinn to St. Petersburg (Russia). 
Also, a number of mergers and acquisitions took place between ICT 
enterprises. The establishment of Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications 
company and the subsequent sale of Ericsson’s own mobile telephone 
manufacturing plants to a competitor was, further to the general market 
downturn, another major blow for Elcoteq (Elcoteq 2010a). Despite the 
above, in Tallinn (and in other sites) the manufacturing of Ericsson mobile 
network equipment and Nokia telephones continues for the time being.
Initially, Elcoteq engineering centre, which is in charge of prototype test-
ing and new product introduction, was located in Finland. In 2000, a new 
engineering centre was established in Tallinn, Estonia. In 2002 one more 
engineering centre was established in Beijing, China. To strengthen its 
engineering capabilities even further, Elcoteq bought the R&D unit of the 
Finnish mobile telephone and telematics company Benefon in 2002 
(Elcoteq 2010a).
In the 2000s, Elcoteq had to adjust to a weaker demand and a general 
slowdown in the ICT industry. It was acknowledged that manufacturing 
activities alone would not be sufficient for sustaining profit margins in the 
changed market environment. Consequently, Elcoteq started to further its 
own design, R&D, engineering and after-sales services. Special New 
Product Introduction (NPI) centres were established within Elcoteq to 
strengthen the co-operation with clients and their design houses in test-
ing prototypes and making preparations for actual production.
Although Elcoteq had all the capabilities for designing mobile telephones, 
and even developed at one point in time one handset for Ericsson, it did 
not challenge its main customers in R&D and product development, but 
remained a contract manufacturer. The competition continued to inten-
sify in the EMS business on all fronts in the 2000s. For example, Nokia 
started to source some of its printed circuit boards from Foxconn (Hon 
Hai) and GKI in Asia, and handled the manufacturing all together in-house 
in Brazil. In the mid-2000s, Nokia continued to streamline its supplier 
network, and gave a preference to larger vertically integrated suppliers 
such as the Foxconn and BYD. As a result Elcoteq was eventually forced 
to downsize significantly its Nokia handset business (Seppälä 2010). 
Elcoteq started therefore to capitalise increasingly on its telecommunica-
tions equipment manufacturing competences by manufacturing, later in 25
the 2000s, to an even broader set of clients. Along with this, new plants 
were also inaugurated in Bangalore (India) and St. Petersburg (Russia) in 
2005. In the same year Elcoteq was reincorporated as a European Com-
pany (SE) and the regional headquarters was established in Budapest 
(Hungary) for managing European operations. Furthermore, the domicile 
of the company was transferred from Lohja to Luxembourg in 2008. 
The recent global financial and economic crisis brought about another 
restructuring of the Elcoteq global network. During 2009 the factories in 
Arad (Romania), Richardson (US) and St. Petersburg (Russia) were closed 
down. The factory in Shenzhen was consolidated into the factory in Bei-
jing in China. Part of the Elcoteq Tallinn plant, which earlier served Erics-
son, was sold to Ericsson. With this transaction, some 1200 employees 
of Elcoteq Tallinn moved also to Ericsson (Elcoteq Annual Report 2009). 
After this transaction, Ericsson continues to produce 4G (LTE) mobile 
network equipment in Tallinn, for which TeliaSonera in Sweden is one of 
Ericsson’s most important customers. 
In response to the above, Elcoteq has extended its client portfolio and 
continues to operate its EMS business on a global scale (Figure 11). It 
continues to produce both mobile handsets and infrastructure systems. 
On a global scale,, almost all major telecommunications equipment pro-
ducers, incl. Nokia, Samsung, LG, Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Huawei, etc., 
continue to be Elcoteq's clients. Further to this, Elcoteq has established 
itself also in the production of flat screen TVs. (Elcoteq 2010b) In Europe, 
the plant located in Hungary is Elcoteq’s main mass production plant, 
while Elcoteq Tallinn with its approximately 300 staff continues to cater 
for smaller niche markets.
Figure 11. The location of Elcoteq sites
Source: Elcoteq Annual Report 2009.26
Overall, in a global comparison, Elcoteq still continues to be a fairly small 
electronics manufacturing service provider. Elcoteq revenues were 1500 
million euros in 2009 (Elcoteq 2010b). The revenues of Foxconn and 
Flextronix – the largest contract manufacturing companies in the world 
– were, however, 21 and 15 times larger in the same year. This is why 
Elcoteq continues to focus on the technologically and organisationally 
more demanding small and medium scale manufacturing rather than large 
scale mass production, where the big competitors have an advantage.
4.3. Disruptive telecommunications service: the case of Skype
Internet was in the 1970-1980s, when the development of the modern 
digital telephone systems standards began, anything but widespread. At 
that time, voice communications were the primary means of communica-
tion, and most data communications ran on dial-up lines at what is by 
today’s standards a very low speed. In a word, the architecture and busi-
ness models of modern digital telecommunications systems were origi-
nally built for voice communication that gets billed per minute of use. 
The very rapid spread of the Internet and the development of the underly-
ing communications technologies has brought about major technological 
disruptions in the telecommunications industry since the 1990s. With 
broadband Internet access, there is no billing per minute, and interna-
tional communications are virtually free of charge. The above technologi-
cal change prepared, thereby, the ground for a major disruption in the 
whole telecommunications industry, since it became feasible to route 
otherwise costly telephone calls over the Internet, where international 
communications are virtually free of charge and no traditional billing per 
minute of use applies. 
This is exactly where the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) entered the 
scene from the mid-1990s. Skype is a VoIP software application that 
allows anyone to talk to anyone else on the Internet free of charge. It 
allows the calls, for a modest fee, also to be routed to the ‘old school’ 
telephone network. Skype was founded in 2003 by the Swedish and 
Danish entrepreneurs Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis. Skype’s soft-
ware development team was from the very beginning located in Tallinn, 
Estonia, which became immediately its largest office in terms of the 
number of staff. 
The first beta version of Skype, which was released in August 2003, 
allowed for computer-to-computer voice calls. No other services were 
available. This very first software attracted the first 1 million registered 
users in only a matter of months. Subsequently, additional services (text 27
chat, SkypeOut and SkypeIn calls to and from regular telephones, video 
calls, etc.) and support for additional devices (Apple Mac, Linux, special 
Skype Phones and Skype application for various smartphones) appeared.
Skype was not the first service to enter the VoIP market, but its ease of 
use, and the possibility of (multiparty) video calls, along with the free 
service, differentiate Skype very strongly from both other traditional and 
VoIP telephone services. The above, in combination with a hugely scal-
able peer-to-peer architecture and clever marketing made it an instant 
success. Skype, which offered initially only voice calls, has also differen-
tiated itself increasingly from the competition by offering video and multi-
party conference calls. Video capable software appeared first for Micro-
soft Windows in 2008. The Android and iPhone software that was intro-
duced in 2009 included also video functionality. Skype was also the first 
to utilise networked flat screen TV-s, which have started to include built-
in Skype software since 2010.
Skype had already 75 million registered users by 2005. As of 2011, 
Skype has more than 560 million registered users. The “cross-border traf-
fic routed by Skype, by far the largest provider of Internet-based voice 
communications, is projected to grow by an astonishing 45 billion min-
utes in 2010—more than twice the volume added by all of the world’s 
phone companies, combined.” (Figure 12). Furthermore, 40 percent of 
Skype calls are actually video calls today (Skype 2010, Tuaw 2011).
Figure 12. International long-distance calls and Skype traffic 2005-2010.
Source: Telegeography 2011.28
Skype has gone truly global not only in terms of its customer base, but 
also in terms of the location of its business functions during the last five 
years. As noted above, it was the combination of the experienced Scan-
dinavian start-up managers and Estonian engineering talent that were at 
the core of Skype’s immediate success. Soon, as Skype was seeking to 
attract international venture capital and to get closer to major marketing 
channels, the corporate headquarters were established in Luxembourg and 
an office was also set up in London. Although the headquarters were in 
Luxembourg, Tallinn and London remained the largest offices, and most of 
the decision-making continued to take place between these two offices.
In Q4 2005, eBay purchased Skype for approximately 2.5 billion U.S. 
dollars of upfront payment (eBay 2005). In connection with this deal, a 
Skype office was also set up in the United States, close to eBay's head-
quarters. The Skype office in the United States continued to operate as 
a marketing, sales and support office servicing the Americas. More 
recently, general management of the Skype4Business business line was 
also moved to the U.S., as the Americas are globally the largest market 
for enterprise communications, and some of the Skype’s strategic part-
ners for this business line, e.g., Avaya, are also located there.
Smaller Skype offices emerged also in Singapore and Hong Kong. These 
offices are in charge of the marketing, sales and support in Asia. Their 
perhaps even more important function is to maintain close contacts with 
the manufacturers of the increasing variety of different Skype enabled 
devices, including flat screen TVs, in Asia (Figure 13). 
Figure 13. The location of Skype sites
Source: Skype, October 2010.29
Even though PayPal, another eBay firm, proved a good payment partner 
for Skype, eBay itself was not able to build major synergies between its 
main business line and Skype. Furthermore in 2008, a legal dispute 
emerged between Skype and its original founders over the rights to 
Skype’s underlying peer-to-peer communications technology. This con-
tributed to the lessening of eBay’s interest in Skype even further. Eventu-
ally, in November 2009, eBay sold 70% of Skype to a consortium com-
prising Silver Lake Partners, CPPIB, Andreessen Horowitz, and the original 
Scandinavian founders, valuing the business at 2.75 billion dollars. 
Less than a year later, in August 2010, Skype filed with the SEC for list-
ing on the NASDAQ stock exchange, where it sought to raise up to 100 
million dollars in an initial public offering (Skype 2010). These plans were, 
however, cancelled, as Skype and Microsoft entered into a definitive 
agreement in spring 2011,whereby Microsoft will acquire Skype for 8.5 
billion dollars. Once approval is received from the regulators, Skype will 
become a new business division of Microsoft. It is quite obvious, even 
though no public information exists in this relation, that Microsoft was 
willing to pay a very high price for Skype both in order to secure its late 
entry into the very rapidly growing VoIP market as well as to avoid the 
further strengthening of the other dominant firms in this market, such as, 
e.g., Google and Facebook.
Skype has been, typically for a venture capital backed start-up, essen-
tially from its birth in an aggressive growth phase, and the availability of 
suitably qualified labour has been one of its important concerns. Initially 
Skype hired engineers and other personnel, e.g. for localisation and sup-
port functions, etc., rather aggressively in Estonia. However, as it 
emerged that no more suitably qualified labour was available in Estonia, 
a second engineering centre was established in Prague in 2007. 
Overall, Skype continued to recruit its personnel internationally, indicating 
quite often for an open position two or three key locations where the 
newly enrolled person could start working. This has led to Skype’s rather 
unique management model, where the various multidisciplinary teams 
operate indeed in most cases within Skype but on a trans-country basis. 
For example, the Prague engineering centre operates today largely as a 
satellite of the primary engineering centre in Tallinn. The Prague-based 
developers report to the team leaders who typically are located in Estonia. 
It is also quite common for the product managers and other mid-level 
managers who are in charge of development to be located part- or even 
full-time outside Estonia, for example in London or elsewhere.30
Skype has acquired the required talents rather aggressively by acquiring 
other smaller firms that have the personnel with the required capabilities, 
relocating, if necessary, also the persons concerned to one of its offices. 
The purchase of the Norwegian start-up Sonorit Holding AS, a provider 
of voice technology for the Internet, in April 2006 is an example of the 
flexibility companies like Skype exhibit in attracting the very top talents
11
. 
The main motivation behind this acquisition was really the knowledge and 
talent this Norwegian company had regarding audio-video codecs
12
 and 
regarding VoIP systems more broadly. As the acquired company itself did 
not yet even have an office in Norway, an office was set up for them in 
Stockholm, the closest possible location to the engineering centre in Tal-
linn. Nowadays, in this Skype Stockholm office some of the most 
advanced audio-video R&D in Europe takes place. Given the deep spe-
cialisation and the knowledge pool that is available in this Skype unit, a 
close exchange of information also takes place there with different 
research institutes and universities across the globe.
“Skype currently employs 850 staff, with most of its engineers in Esto-
nia, though its disparate operations include a Luxembourg headquarters, 
marketing operations in London and audio-visual engineering in Stock-
holm. [The Skype CEO] Mr Bates said he plans to hire up to 400 new 
staff this year, with 80 per cent of these in Silicon Valley” (FT 2011). 
The newly established engineering facility in Palo Alto, California, will 
specialise primarily on development for the Apple IOS and Google 
Android mobile computing platforms, for which engineering personnel is 
more easily available on the western coast of the United States as com-
pared to Europe.
5. Competence-building on the enterprise level in Estonia
5.1. Worker level 
Ericsson, Elcoteq and Skype as global firms operate in very different mar-
ket segments in the production of telecommunications systems. The 
specialisation and, thus, also the labour requirements of the Estonian 
subsidiaries of these firms are also very different. Both Ericsson and 
Elcoteq primarily manufacturing and various support activities in Estonia, 
while Skype has its main software development centre located in Estonia. 
11  In early 2011, Skype acquired another well-known Internet video communications firm Qik, 
in order to reinforce Skype’s video functionality even further.
12  A codec is a specialised software (or device), which is capable of encoding and/or decoding 
a signal or a digital data stream. Audio and video codecs that are discussed here are responsible 
for encoding the analog audio and video signals into a digital data stream and decoding these 
in the receiving end pack into a voice and video that a human being can understand.31
The structure of the labour force of these firms is, accordingly, also very 
different in Estonia. Manufacturing floor workers constitute a significant 
share of Ericsson’s and Elcoteq’s employees in Estonia. Contrastingly, 
Skype chiefly employs engineering personnel in Estonia, and the lower 
qualification levels are of limited importance for this firm. This is obvi-
ously also reflected in the capability building of these firms.
Furthermore, it is largely the former Elcoteq personnel that operate 
today’s Ericsson plant in Tallinn. Therefore, most Elcoteq-related observa-
tions simultaneously also reflect human resource development that has 
taken place in relation to the plant in Tallinn now owned by Ericsson.
In the early 1990s, when Elcoteq started its manufacturing operations in 
Estonia, it built largely on the personnel that had become available from 
the former Soviet electronics industry. At this period in time, low (labour) 
costs and the geographical and cultural proximity to Finland made Estonia 
an attractive location for the expansion of production. Today, most of the 
enrolled workers are expected, preferably, to have previous work experi-
ence in the electronics industry. The textile and clothing industry, where 
employment was decreasing in the 2000s, has also however been an 
important source of experienced manufacturing workers for electronics 
manufacturing in Estonia. 
Previous work experience is also important, as advanced electronics 
manufacturing involves some tasks, e.g. tuning radio communications 
equipment or diagnostics of manufactured products, where the neces-
sary skills and productivity levels can only be achieved in practice. 
Today, an average Elcoteq manufacturing flow worker has 5-6 years of 
work experience in the firm. With the cyclical downturn in the industry, 
Elcoteq had some redundancies in the workforce the first half of 2009. 
More recently, however, a number of previous workers have been 
attracted back to their old jobs.
Elcoteq Tallinn considers the flexibility of its work organisation one of its 
main competitive advantages. The workers need to be able to switch 
rapidly from the needs of one client and the related manufacturing setup 
to another. Continuous on-the-job (client-specific) training to familiarise 
the workers with the specific production line and their specific tasks dur-
ing the manufacturing process is the main training activity that takes 
place in Elcoteq and Ericsson at this qualification level. It is not uncom-
mon for such training that one of the more knowledgeable operators of 
the surface mounting equipment (SMA operators, for short) instructs the 
other assemblers and operators, while the Quality Control Department 
oversees and supports such an internal training process when necessary.32
Contrastingly, the limited number of basic worker level staff members 
only plays a minor support role in Skype, where most of the staff are 
involved in advanced engineering tasks in Estonia. Accordingly, this is not 
the key qualification level for capability building within Skype.
5.2. Technical and supervisory level
In Elcoteq, worker training is also connected with career opportunities, 
as more knowledgeable and experienced workers have the possibility to 
acquire qualifications that allow them to become foremen, who are in 
charge of groups of workers. Typically, such senior workers are also 
themselves familiar with the basics of business management and quality 
control techniques like Six Sigma or similar. In other words, there is a 
clearly established and well-communicated career path in Elcoteq. This 
is also the preferred way the supervisory level staff grow within the 
company.
In addition to client and product-specific training, management training is 
offered to supervisory-level workers, such as for example foremen. The 
management training offered to them includes skills for motivating team 
members, enhancement of skills for cooperation with engineers from 
other teams, quality control, etc. All foremen have a basic, i.e. yellow belt 
level knowledge of Six Sigma. Importantly, foremen and senior workers 
are also in charge of acquiring workers’ proposals for improvement (inno-
vation!). Such a continuous improvement system is also supported 
through the bonus system.
The company is building linkages with the Estonian education system. 
The main strategic partner is the University of Applied Sciences (Tallinna 
Tehnikakõrgkool), which is a professional higher educational institution, 
with the aim of providing professional higher educational studies (engi-
neering diploma education, with 4 years of study) in the field of engi-
neering.
For Skype, the technical level is really the lowest qualification level that 
is relevant to its core activities. The technical jobs in this firm still 
related to basic web development, language translation, etc., as well as 
various maintenance and support activities. The difference between the 
technical and engineering levels is essentially that of the creativity, tech-
nology and management knowledge, and of the experience of the 
respective persons. There is, therefore, similarly to Elcoteq, a possibility 
for technical workers to become engineers, in case they acquire more 
knowledge and experience.33
This is why Skype has an on-line Global Learning Zone (GLZ) that con-
tains specific learning materials accessible to everyone in the firm. There 
is also a specialised on-line reference library of technical literature that 
everyone can access. The objective of the GLZ is to lead all staff mem-
bers to the relevant reading materials and/or training courses they con-
sider necessary for themselves. Another related objective is to keep 
everyone in the firm up to date on the modus operandi of the firm and to 
communicate forthcoming changes in the organisation.
Technical jobs are ones for which, universally for all case study firms, 
internship opportunities are most frequently offered. Intern recruitment is 
handled through the regular recruitment channels. Higher qualification 
levels are, as it is easy to understand, normally not open to interns due 
to the greater importance of the previous training and work experience, 
as well as sensitivity of materials used.
5.3. Engineering levels 
Workers and foremen do not have direct communications with clients for 
whom Elcoteq and Ericsson manufacture their products. In Elcoteq, such 
communication is limited to the management and engineers who are in 
charge of setting up production lines, including systems for testing prod-
uct quality. The division of tasks is basically the same in Ericsson between 
the R&D and product development that takes place outside Estonia, and 
the manufacturing that takes place in Estonia. 
From the mid-2000s Elcoteq built up a New Product Introduction (NPI) 
unit in Estonia, which was to assist clients in the final design and testing 
of their electronics products and in the preparation of production. This 
unit disappeared in Elcoteq with the transition of most of Elcoteq’s previ-
ous activities and staff members to Ericsson in 2010. Currently, Elcoteq’s 
engineering facilities are very tiny in Estonia. Elcoteq currently has four 
product engineers, two process engineers and one test engineer cur-
rently in Estonia. Additionally, there are 7 quality control engineers, and 
7 engineers who are in charge of after-market (repair) services. In other 
words, the engineering workforce is clearly a minor share of Elcoteq’s 
300-person workforce in Estonia.
Elcoteq has recently recruited a new product engineer and a new quality 
control engineer simultaneously with the introduction of a new client. For 
the introduction of the new engineers (as well as other supervisory level 
workers) to the firm, a 6-month in-house training programme is provided. 
After that, typically, the client trains the Elcoteq engineers in the course 
of the introduction of the new products on the related requirements. No 
other broader intra-firm training system exists for engineers. 34
There is, however, strong competition for the best workforce between 
the different (mostly foreign-owned) electronics manufacturers in Estonia, 
which on occasion leads to intense headhunting. For example, it has been 
very difficult for Elcoteq to recruit a new lead engineer in Estonia recent-
ly in spite of active headhunting.
In summary, it still cannot be said that the lack of strong engineers with 
industrial experience has been the most important impediment to 
Elcoteq’s activities being upgraded from electronics manufacturing ser-
vice provision to the more R&D and knowledge-intensive design of its 
products. It has rather been the deliberate decision of the whole of 
Elcoteq as a global EMS service provider to not compete with its custom-
ers in R&D and product development. 
Computer scientists and software engineers have generally been easier to 
find and recruit than microelectronics and industrial engineers in Estonia. 
Skype’s main engineering facilities are, as discussed above, largely locat-
ed in Estonia for historic reasons. This is where software development in 
Skype was initially established and additional engineering workforce was 
recruited as necessary.
The Global Learning Zone is, as discussed above, the key learning 
resource within Skype. All the various training possibilities are communi-
cated across all Skype offices through this tool. In staff training the 
70-20-10 principle applies: 70% of learning occurs on the job, 20% in 
the form of intra-firm coaching/mentorship, and no more than 10% of the 
working time is dedicated to classroom training or similar. For the latter, 
trainers come mainly from other EU member states (mostly the UK) as 
well as the United States. 
5.4. Management and marketing levels 
None of the three case study firms have their top management located in 
Estonia, i.e. their overall strategic planning and management take place 
elsewhere. Their marketing and sales activities are also, typically of any 
multinational corporation, globally dispersed and located close to (poten-
tial) key customers. Normally, the personnel of Estonian subsidiaries do 
not have a direct role in marketing and sales, except for Ericsson’s mar-
keting and sales on the Estonian market.
It is the business development managers at the corporate level who are 
in charge of client interaction, and hand over the planning of the specific 
production lines over to the engineers in Elcoteq. In this, the choice of the 
specific manufacturing plant depends largely on the general industry 
dynamics, the location and the needs of the client rather than anything 35
else. In Ericsson, largely the same model applies, although the ‘client’ is 
either the headquarters or another subsidiary in the same firm. The sub-
sidiary in Estonia is, in both cases, effectively locked in manufacturing 
and support functions that the overall corporate strategy and the alloca-
tion of roles between the different subsidiaries foresee. 
Capability building at the management level is in any international firm 
ultimately about the recruitment of the right persons, and offering them 
stimuli for personal development and achievement of corporate business 
objectives. 
Elcoteq has a global HR organisation, which has strengthened in the last 
few years. They offer a global personal development plan and bonus sys-
tem, which seeks to translate the management targets set for a specific 
manufacturing site into the objectives and stimuli offered to the individu-
al staff members. Also, the standardisation of the work places has start-
ed recently across the different subsidiaries in Elcoteq. Currently, there is 
an on-going, bottom-up mapping process whose aim is to document 
existing work places. Thereafter, the global HR organisation will be advis-
ing, top-down, the individual subsidiaries on possible revisions to their 
existing HR management and organisation of work.
What makes the internal management structure of Skype different is that 
it grew very rapidly from a small start-up firm to a major global actor. 
Initially, in Skype, personnel were largely recruited in different geograph-
ic locations where it was available at a particular point in time. The cost 
of explosive growth, which a successful VC-backed start-up must 
achieve, is, however, the extremely rapid growing complexity of its cor-
porate management. As a result, there are today virtually no functional 
teams within Skype, where the team itself, the head of the team, and the 
boss of the head of the team would be located in the same country. 
This is why Skype has now started to streamline its HR strategy, and is 
increasingly applying a competence-centre model. The aim is to concen-
trate the specific competences typically into no more than two offices. 
This is, obviously, to allow for greater synergy between the staff mem-
bers, and to simplify the management. While the very top R&D talents 
may possibly remain an exception, where there is a lot of flexibility and 
interest for cooperation across the globe, the majority of the personnel 
are now increasingly employed in the existing locations of the specific 
teams within Skype that require additional workforce.
Centralised HR management, including personal development and training 
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Skype’s HR Department largely the above general competence-centre 
model. Each of the competence areas, e.g. engineering, etc., has its own 
global head of HR. The HR Department in Estonia deals primarily with the 
recruitment of the engineering work force. In human resources manage-
ment, the development of the personal development plans of employees 
plays an important role in Skype, as personal development is very impor-
tant in keeping the creative class motivated in their work.
The SCRUM management technique is applied in the software develop-
ment process in Skype. It is an iterative process, where interdisciplinary 
teams select from the backlog a set of more important requests for 
improvement and implement these within a limited timeframe (typically a 
two to four-week period). For the improvement of the use of the SCRUM 
technique within Skype, mostly United States-based external experts 
have been used.
Skype offers separate training resources and programmes for the man-
agement staff. There is, for example, a 3-day joint management training 
programme with Harvard Business School on “managing the Skype way”, 
which discusses a broad set of themes that are topical for a multicultural 
global firm (active listening, international communications, tough conver-
sations, etc.).
The recruitment of competent leaders for groups of 100-150 people 
remains problematic both in Estonia and Europe in general. The most 
often suitably qualified (and experienced) managers are found in the 
United States. Such managers are, therefore, often recruited in the US 
and seconded for 2-3 years in Estonia or another European office, as 
needed. Mobility is also very active between the different Skype offices 
in the opposite direction. Estonian staff members have been, for example, 
active in building up various other offices and are currently also active in 
building up Skype’s new development centre in the United States. 
5.5. Innovation levels 
The above case studies very clearly that both the importance of the staff 
on the different qualification levels as well as the capability building that 
occurs at the corporate level are very strongly dependent on the strategy of 
a particular firm and its role in global production and innovation networks. 
Electronics manufacturing service providers, such as Elcoteq, manufac-
ture various products that are developed by major industry leaders, such 
as Nokia or Ericsson, and its own R&D activities remain very modest. The 
innovation and the related capability building that take place in electronics 37
manufacturing still primarily have to do with process and organisational 
innovation (Figure 14). Elcoteq’s service line for New Product Introduc-
tion is perhaps the closest to what could be considered to be joint R&D 
activities with clients. 
The same largely applies for manufacturing plants that major brand names 
like Ericsson own themselves. It is perhaps just that the latter manufac-
turing facilities tend to be used more often for the introduction of com-
pletely new products than ones owned by independent service providers. 
Microelectronics design-related activities are, however, currently very 
strongly constrained by the lack of suitable engineering and R&D work-
force in Estonia. Furthermore, the high and increasing capital intensity of 
the modern microelectronics industry seems to be one of the main reasons 
the various indigenous ICT firms focus on software rather than micro-
electronics.
Figure 14. Technological upgrading within Elcoteq in Estonia
Source: authors.
Skype has its main R&D and engineering centre, where most of the 
development and testing of new products and services takes place, 
located in Estonia. This does not mean, however, that the basic research 
or in-house R&D would be the predominant source of learning and 
capability-building in Skype. Much less formalised forms of learning by 
doing, interaction within the different Skype offices and Skype’s outside 
partners, as well as corporate education and training resources, continue 38
as much more important sources of inspiration for Skype’s software 
developers (Figure 15). 
Furthermore, it is perhaps the key lesson from the case of Skype (from 
the above cases) that building a highly innovative and successful business 
does not always necessitate major basic R&D efforts. The overall com-
petitive situation in the industry, the major technological breakthroughs 
that occur independently of any specific firm, and many other factors can 
prove much more important than the R&D efforts of a particular firm.
Figure 15. Technological upgrading within Skype in Estonia
Source: authors.
The cooperation between Skype and the public education and R&D sys-
tems of different countries has also thus far remained fairly limited, as 
public education systems are always slow to respond and the company 
in an early expansion phase could not wait for too long to actually see 
the results
13
. Instead, Skype has, as discussed above, acquired the 
required talents rather aggressively, where they could be found more eas-
ily and quickly, relocating, if necessary, the persons concerned to one of 
its offices. 
13  However, Skype continues to make attempts to initiate cooperation with higher education 
institutions in order to strengthen the future supply of qualified labour in Estonia. So far, this 
cooperation has mostly taken the form of Skype engineers lecturing at specific courses in Esto-
nia. As part of such interaction with universities, research topics are also proposed for master’s 
and doctoral theses, etc.39
Overall, all of the three cases exemplify that the innovation takes place in 
industry is often much more multifaceted than is often assumed in innova-
tion studies. It is not enough to focus on R&D, when in analysing the 
evolution of the GINs and the related capability building. The different 
sources and forms of innovation, including learning by doing, adoption of 
technologies developed elsewhere, organisational and business model 
innovations, all need to be taken into consideration.
6. Discussion and conclusions
6.1. Industry life cycles and relocation of production and innovation 
The industry life cycles and techno-economic paradigms literature (Vernon 
1966, Perez 2002), which unfortunately does not get too often referred to 
in innovation studies, seems to explain the observed industry development 
pattern very nicely. According to this literature, the various economic activ-
ities get gradually relocated from developed to the developing economies, 
as the technologies disseminate, initial knowledge advantages vanish and, 
thereby, the importance of the economies of scale increases in time
14 15
. 
The Nordic mobile telephony industry pioneers, Ericsson and Nokia, origi-
nally designed and manufactured most of the critical components of mobile 
telephone systems in-house. Soon, as production volumes increased, they 
started contracting certain manufacturing functions out to electronics 
manufacturing service providers like Elcoteq while keeping critical techno-
logical know-how, product design and marketing functions in-house. When 
demand on more distant markets followed the lead of the Nordic countries, 
both Ericsson and Nokia as major producers globalised very rapidly, also 
thereby bringing about the globalisation of their manufacturing service pro-
viders and service centres like Elcoteq. It was the very closely-knit business 
relationship between Elcoteq and its key customers that did not allow 
Elcoteq to compete with its clients in R&D and product development.
However, nothing denied competitors from developing similar technolo-
gies and products. Therefore, after some time, the focal point in the 
industry started to shift from developed countries to developing countries, 
14  Traditionally, the off-shoring primarily entailed for the relocation of production, after-sales 
support and customer care, etc. 
15  In this context, usually, the natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, and efficiency-seeking 
have been the main motivation for investment in developing countries. R&D is not, however, as 
important a type of input in traditional industries as it is in ICTs today (Moncada-Paternò-
Castello et al 2010). This also perhaps explains why the strategic technological assets or capa-
bilities-seeking behaviour has also recently become more important, especially in the context of 
the relocation of science-based industries (Dunning & Lundan 2008:67).40
as developed markets became saturated and local producers, like Sam-
sung, Huawei, HTC or LG, strengthened on the emerging markets. As a 
result, the Nordic manufacturers find themselves today squeezed between 
Apple as a new entrant to the high end of the market, and the various 
Asian manufacturers who also keep increasing their market share.
Along with the above, consolidation continues to take place in the indus-
try, and earning power keeps shifting to firms that are able to establish 
and control dominant technology platforms from R&D and product devel-
opment to production and all sorts of value added services, including the 
various applications that run on modern smartphones.
In fact consolidation continues to take place not only on the supply side, 
but also on the demand side of the industry, as large telecommunications 
service providers, e.g., Vodafone, France Telecom, and Telefonica, have 
acquired shares of various smaller operators across the globe. As a result, 
both clients’ and suppliers’ market power has increased remarkably, and 
the barriers to entry have been heightened for latecomers to the industry.   
6.2. Capability building and the catching-up strategies for the latecomers
The established platform leaders in the production of telecommunications 
systems continue to enjoy vast economies of scale across their whole 
value chain from R&D and production to marketing and sales. For these 
reasons, independent market entry has become increasingly difficult for 
latecomers to the established industry, unless they are able to challenge 
the established technological standards or business models, thereby alter-
ing the established rules of the game.
The above three cases are in this context very interesting, as Ericsson, 
Elcoteq and Skype have all specialised in very different parts of the 
mobile telephony value chain. Both the time of their market entry as well 
as the rationale of their global location choice, including the requirements 
for the workforce, have also varied substantially. Ericsson has specialised 
in the design and production of its own telecommunications equipment 
for a long time, and has a long tradition of related in-house R&D activities. 
Ericsson and Nokia defined a whole new industry in the 1980-1990s with 
their R&D efforts and entry to the mobile telephony industry. This allowed 
them to reap the benefits of early growth in this industry.
Later on, the partnerships with or acquisitions of the relevant units of the 
competing firms have been some of the strongest shapers of Ericsson’s 
global innovation and production networks. Different technical standards 
have also played a very important role in influencing the location choice 41
for R&D and innovation. For example, China has been successful in utilis-
ing the vast market size of its domestic market in reinforcing its own 
technological standards. This has forced major equipment manufacturers 
to customise their already existing products or to develop new ones. This 
has also allowed for domestic latecomer firms, such as Huawei, more 
time for product development. China has also been successful in using its 
administrative power for increasing the importance of local input in for-
eign investment enterprises’ production activities, thereby gradually 
upgrading the capabilities of local suppliers. This is for example how 
Elcoteq’s local supplier network was gradually upgraded from basic met-
als and plastics to various electronics parts in China. 
The above is obviously not so easy to follow in smaller firms and econo-
mies that do not have a large pool of R&D workforce or significant market 
power. The case of Skype illustrates, nonetheless, that even tiny new-
comer actors can actually outcompete established, major multinational 
firms, if they are able to adopt new disruptive technologies and business 
models that allow for transforming the rules of the game in the whole 
industry. 
Even though Skype’s success is very strongly a result of Estonia’s engi-
neering talent, this success story would have never happened without 
access to international top-class venture capital and experienced senior 
management. It is, therefore, perhaps the most important lesson of all of 
the above case studies that capability building in terms of technological 
capabilities is extremely necessary. It is, however, not sufficient for par-
ticipation in global production and innovation networks, and successfully 
catching up. This success still ultimately depends on the right time for 
market entry, superior product(s), a winning business strategy and world-
class execution.  
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